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Abstract
In recessions, predominantly men lose their jobs, which has given rise to the term ”man-
cessions”. We analyze whether fiscal expansions bring men back into jobs. To do so, we
estimate vector-autoregressive models and identify the effects of fiscal shocks and non-fiscal
shocks on the gender composition of employment. We show that contractionary non-fiscal
shocks lead to man-cessions, i.e. employment falls and more strongly so for men. By contrast,
an expansionary fiscal shock predominantly raises the employment of women. Taken together,
these results imply a trade-off dilemma for policy that seeks to stabilize the level of employment
along with its composition.
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1 Introduction
In economic downturns, predominantly men are laid off. This observation received particular
attention in the public debate during the Great Recession when the term ”man-cession” was
coined.1 For example, between 2007Q3 and 2009Q1, more than three out of four (78%) of the jobs
lost in the US were held by men. In relative terms, male employment fell by 4.8% while female
employment fell by only 1.4%. Notably, the observation of man-cessions is neither restricted to
the Great Recession nor to the US economy. For instance, Wall (2009) and Hoynes, Miller, and
Schaller (2012) have documented similar observations during every recession since 1968. Similarly,
Contessi and Li (2014) have found evidence for stronger surges in male unemployment in each of
the G7 countries and the OECD as a whole during the 2007-2009 downturn.
Against this background, fiscal policy deserves particular attention. Expansionary fiscal policy
not only intends to stabilize the total level of employment, but stabilizing the distribution of
employment is often an additional, major goal of fiscal policy in times of crisis. For example, point
2 in the statement of purpose of the ARRA stimulus of 2008 stated that it was the bill’s goal
”to assist those most impacted by the recession”. According to the evidence above, those most
impacted by the recession were predominantly men. In fact, some commentators criticized the
ARRA stimulus for the supposed gender composition of the created jobs.2
In this paper, we investigate the effects of fiscal policy on the distribution of employment
by gender. We estimate vector-autoregressive (VAR) models and identify fiscal and non-fiscal
(business-cycle) shocks using sign restrictions. We consider sign restrictions as the most suitable
identification procedure for our purposes because this method allows us to easily discriminate
between fiscal policy on the one hand and all other drivers of the business cycle on the other hand.
Specifically, our econometric treatment informs us whether non-fiscal shocks are associated with
man-cessions in the first place, at the same time being informative about whether fiscal shocks
have a different effect than non-fiscal shocks on the gender composition of employment. The VAR
models are estimated on quarterly time series data for the US covering the period 1964Q1 to
2013Q4. Our baseline VAR includes data on GDP, the primary budget deficit, employment, and
1Economist Mark Perry, who coined the term, testified on the issue of man-cessions before the Means and Ways
committee of the US congress on June 17, 2010.
2Interestingly, both directions of gender inequity have been discussed, see, for instance, the contributions by Christina
Hoff Sommers in the Weekly Standard (Jun. 29, 2009) and by Bryce Covert in the Huffington Post (Sep. 24, 2010).
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the employment ratio between women and men. Fiscal shocks and non-fiscal shocks are identified
via sign restrictions on the responses of GDP and the primary deficit, following Pappa (2009).
Our results confirm that man-cessions are an important and robust feature of the business cycle.
We show that non-fiscal shocks generate a negative co-movement between the relative employment
of women and aggregate measures of the business cycle such as GDP or employment. This means
that male employment is more responsive to cyclical changes than female employment, which is in
line with previous evidence on man-cessions, reviewed below.
Most interestingly, we document that the reverse holds for fiscal policy shocks. Fiscal shocks
lead to a positive co-movement between aggregate measures of the business cycle and the relative
employment of women. This means that, in response to fiscal expansions, the employment of
women rises significantly more strongly than the employment of men.
Taken together, this has striking policy implications. Men are hit hardest in recessions but a
fiscal stimulus predominantly fosters job creation for women. Thus, fiscal policy faces a trade-off
dilemma. On the one hand, the goal of fiscal policy is to stabilize the total level of employment.
On the other hand, fiscal policy intends to stabilize the composition of employment. Our results
suggest that fiscal policy can only achieve one of these goals. If a contractionary non-fiscal shock is
counteracted by a fiscal stimulus, the drop in aggregate employment is cushioned but more women
than men are brought into jobs. In turn, this amplifies the fluctuation in the gender composition
of employment.
In a second part of the paper, we perform a sequence of additional evaluations in order to explore
the role of sectors, occupations, and industries for our results. Specifically, we first investigate the
dynamics of government employment to account for a potential composition effect, as women are
over-represented in the government sector. In fact, the increase in government employment after
an expansionary fiscal shock partly explains why fiscal policy has a stronger effect on female than
on male employment but this composition effect is quantitatively small. From a quantitative point
of view, a more important effect is that expansionary fiscal shocks cause employment in female-
dominated, so-called ”pink-collar”, occupations to rise disproportionately. This leads to an increase
in the aggregate share of female employment and appears to be important for understanding the
female-biased employment effects of fiscal policy. By contrast, composition effects reflecting the
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industry mix of created jobs are found to be less important. However, we show that industry
effects are important for understanding why non-fiscal shocks are associated with man-cessions in
the first place. This lends support to the view on man-cessions discussed in the existing literature
(e.g., Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller 2012).
Our paper is related to the literature investigating gender differences in employment cyclicali-
ties, see, e.g., Clark and Summers (1981), Ewing, Levernier, and Malik (2002), Ewing, Levernier,
and Malik (2005), Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010), or Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012).3 This
literature has shown that men bear a disproportionately high share of cyclical employment vari-
ation. Our results with respect to the effects of non-fiscal shocks corroborate this finding. Our
main contribution to this literature is to provide evidence on the effects of fiscal expansions on the
gender composition of employment. Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) have investigated the effects of
a specific fiscal shock, increases in military spending, on different population groups. Their finding
that military spending increases hours worked disproportionately in households with female heads
is broadly consistent with our results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline VAR model
and the main results. Section 3 explores potential explanations of our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The effects of fiscal shocks on the gender composition of employment
In this section, we present our baseline model, the identifying restrictions, and the results of the
estimated model. We estimate a vector-autoregressive model and use sign restrictions to identify
the effects of fiscal policy shocks and non-fiscal shocks on the gender composition of employment.
Our baseline VAR includes constants and three lags of quarterly US data on the primary fiscal
deficit, real GDP, aggregate employment, and the employment ratio between women and men.4 Our
main interest is on the reaction of the gender employment ratio to different shocks. A significant
reaction of the gender employment ratio is tantamount to a significantly different response of
male and female employment to the respective shock. All variables are measured as percentage
deviations from HP trends. Our baseline sample starts in 1964Q1 and ends in 2013Q4. The reduced
3Jefferson (2005), Jefferson (2008), Rodgers (2008) have studied employment fluctuations for other population groups
than gender.
4See Appendix A for details on data sources and data construction.
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form VAR reads
yt = c+
3∑
i=1
Aiyt−i + εt ,
where the vector yt includes the variables described above and c is a vector of constants, A =
[A1, A2, A3] is the coefficient matrix, and εt is the vector of reduced-form residuals. We estimate
the reduced-form VAR with Bayesian techniques using a Minnesota prior.5
We identify a fiscal and a non-fiscal shock using sign restrictions. We impose, following Pappa
(2009), that an expansionary fiscal policy shock (which can be a spending increase or a tax cut or
a combination of both) raises the primary deficit and output.6 By contrast, non-fiscal (business-
cycle) shocks affect the deficit and output in opposite directions. These identifying restrictions can
be derived from mild assumptions: expansionary fiscal policy raises output and the endogenous
component of fiscal policy is not too procyclical (i.e., in non-fiscally induced booms, government
spending does not rise endogenously by more than tax revenues). In order to study fiscal stimuli
that bring people into jobs, we impose a further sign restriction on the employment response to
fiscal shocks. We impose the sign restrictions on impact and in the following three quarters.
Formally, our identification proceeds as outlined in Uhlig (2005). We take a draw A˜ from the
posterior distribution of the coefficient matrix A and calculate the Cholesky decomposition of the
estimated covariance matrix Σ̂ = BB′. We then take a draw ω from the four-dimensional unit
sphere by applying a QR decomposition of a 4 × 4 matrix of random numbers drawn from the
standard normal distribution. We consider shocks b = Bω and the impulse response functions
to b. If they satisfy the sign restrictions, we keep the draw (A˜, ω) and save the impulse response
functions. This procedure is repeated until 10,000 responses to both fiscal and non-fiscal shocks are
found. For each shock, we order the responses of the 10,000 accepted models to obtain a posterior
distribution at each horizon.
Figure 1 summarizes the estimated responses of the variables in our baseline VAR. We display
the median together with the 16th-84th percentiles of the distribution of responses in the accepted
5Specifically, for the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks Σ, we us the estimate Σ̂ from an OLS
estimation of the VAR. The prior means for all entries in c and A are zero. For constants, we set the prior variance
of the coefficients to 100 and to 0.5 ·
σjj
L2·σii
for the impact of the L’th lag of variable j on variable i, where σii and
σjj are diagonal entries from the estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks.
6A similar identification of fiscal shocks has been used by Enders, Mu¨ller, and Scholl (2011).
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models. These probability bands reflect Bayesian parameter uncertainty and identification un-
certainty. The horizontal axes show quarters after the shock and the responses are expressed in
percentage terms. Quantitatively, the responses are rescaled to the case where, at the median,
GDP changes by one percent on impact. The reactions of the deficit, output, and – in case of the
fiscal shock – aggregate employment follow the sign restrictions. After a favorable non-fiscal shock,
we also observe a rise in aggregate employment.
Our main interest is on the reaction of the gender employment ratio, displayed in the lower right
panels of Figures 1(a) and 1(b), respectively. After a favorable non-fiscal shock, the female to male
employment ratio falls significantly. Three quarters after the shock, the response of the gender
ratio is negative in 94.1% of the accepted models. As aggregate employment rises, this means that
male employment rises more strongly than female employment. In the case of an adverse non-fiscal
shock, this means that aggregate employment falls and predominantly male jobs are lost. Thus,
our estimated model shows that contractionary non-fiscal shocks induce man-cessions.
Strikingly, and contrary to the non-fiscal shock, we observe a pro-cyclical response of the
female to male employment ratio conditional on fiscal shocks, see the bottom-right panel in Figure
1(b). After a favorable fiscal shock, there is a significant and delayed rise in the female to male
employment ratio. One year after the shock, 88.1% of the accepted models show a positive response
of the gender employment ratio and this number increases to 97.0% in quarter 10 after the shock.
As aggregate employment rises, see the bottom-left panel of Figure 1(b), one can conclude that
female employment rises more strongly than male employment in response to expansionary fiscal
shocks. Thus, a fiscal stimulus brings predominantly women into jobs.
We now provide some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the absolute employment change
implied by the median responses.7 One year after a contractionary non-fiscal shock which leads
to a decline in GDP by one percent, about 770,000 jobs have been lost, about 495,000 of which
were held by men, corresponding to roughly two thirds of the jobs lost. As a comparison, in the
Great Recession, this number was about three quarters. By contrast, one year after a positive
7The percentage changes in male and female employment can be determined from the responses of aggregate employ-
ment and the gender employment ratio. Let n̂F , n̂M , n̂ = sF n̂F + sM n̂M , and r̂ = n̂F − n̂M denote the percentage
trend deviations of female employment, male employment, total employment, and of the employment ratio, respec-
tively. sF and sM are the mean shares of women and men in total employment, respectively. From our estimations,
we take the medians of n̂ and r̂ and calculate n̂M = n̂ − sF r̂ and n̂F = n̂M + r̂. The long-run means of total
employment, female employment, and male employment in our sample are about 111 million, 46 million, and 65
million, respectively. Multiplying with relative changes gives the total job changes provided in the text.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses in baseline VAR.
(a) Non-fiscal shock
PRIMARY DEFICIT
0 5 10 15
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
OUTPUT
0 5 10 15
0
0.5
1
1.5
AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT
0 5 10 15
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FEMALE TO MALE EMPLOYMENT RATIO
0 5 10 15
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
(b) Fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP is normalized to one percent.
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fiscal shock, the level of employment has risen by about 250,000 jobs. Of these additional jobs,
156,000, or 62%, are held by women. We can compare this number to the mean female share in
total employment, which is 44% in our sample. If 44% of the additional jobs were held by women,
the gender composition of employment would remain unchanged. Hence, the female share of jobs
created in response to a fiscal shock exceeds this composition-neutral share by 18 percentage points.
To demonstrate the importance of this difference, consider the relative growth rates of female and
male employment triggered by the fiscal shock. Relative to about 46 million employed women on
average, the 156,000 created jobs correspond to 0.32% whereas, for men, this number is 0.15%.
Thus, fiscal expansions cause employment growth which is more than twice as strong for women
than for men.
In order to quantify the conditional cyclicality of the gender employment ratio, we compute
the correlations of GDP or aggregate employment, respectively, with the gender employment ratio,
conditional on the two shocks. Conditional on the non-fiscal shock, the female to male employment
ratio has strong negative correlations with GDP and aggregate employment, with estimated con-
temporaneous correlation coefficients of −0.99 and −0.91, respectively. Conditional on the fiscal
shock, in contrast, the female to male employment ratio is positively correlated with the business
cycle. The conditional contemporaneous correlations with GDP and employment are 0.27 and
0.19, respectively. We find even stronger positive correlations of the gender employment ratio with
lags of GDP and employment. For example, the correlation coefficient of the employment ratio
with the four-quarter lag of GDP (employment) is 0.78 (0.76).
Our findings imply that fiscal policy makers are confronted with a trade-off dilemma. Fiscal
policy that stabilizes employment destabilizes its gender composition. A contractionary non-fiscal
shock causes a man-cession: aggregate employment falls and the employment of men falls dispro-
portionately. If fiscal policy reacts to this and boosts aggregate employment, more women than
men are brought into jobs which amplifies the reaction of the gender employment ratio. Hence,
our results suggest that fiscal policy which aims to stabilize the level of employment along with its
composition achieves only one of these goals.
We have performed a series of robustness checks for our baseline results (details can be found in
Appendix B). Our results are robust to: i) including a set of further control variables, specifically,
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the real interest rate, average hourly earnings, private domestic spending, government spending,
and tax revenues, ii) shortening the number of periods for which the sign restrictions are imposed,
iii) relaxing the restriction that the fiscal shock raises aggregate employment, and iv) starting the
sample in 1979, which is the starting date of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) files
of the CPS that will be used in the next section to explore potential explanations for the rise in
the gender employment ratio after a fiscal expansion. In each of these specifications, the female to
male employment ratio reacts negatively to expansionary non-fiscal shocks in at least 90% of the
accepted models. Likewise, in at least 90% of the accepted models, the gender employment ratio
reacts positively to expansionary fiscal shocks. Further, we have decomposed the fiscal shock into
spending hikes and tax cuts, employing opposite sign restrictions on the response of tax revenues.
For both kinds of fiscal shocks, we confirm our main finding that expansionary fiscal shocks foster
job growth predominantly for women.
3 Exploring potential explanations: The role of sectors, occupations, and in-
dustries
In this section, we investigate potential explanations for our finding that fiscal shocks lead to a
stronger increase in female than in male employment. Specifically, we investigate in how far the
documented responses of the gender employment ratio are consequences of the different mean
gender employment ratios in different sectors, industries, and occupations. If employment in
female-dominated occupations (so-called ”pink-collar” occupations, such as personal services) or
industries (for instance, education and health care) reacts differently to fiscal shocks, the aggregate
gender employment ratio would change even if the gender ratio within occupations and industries
remained unchanged. Similar composition effects may occur with respect to government employ-
ment, where women constitute the majority of the workforce. Investigating these issues requires
data on industry and occupation specific employment by demographic groups. As Hoynes, Miller,
and Schaller (2012), we construct disaggregated employment time series using the Merged Outgo-
ing Rotation Groups (MORG) files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Using this source of
data, consistent employment time series can be constructed from 1979 onwards.8
8The sample period for our baseline estimations discussed in Section 2 started in 1964. In Appendix B, we show that
the results for our baseline specification estimated from data starting in 1979 are very similar to the results discussed
in Section 2. We also checked that aggregating the CPS MORG microdata yields virtually identical time series data
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Government employment. The government wage bill is a major part of government consump-
tion expenditures and women are over-represented in government employment.9 Therefore, the
gender employment ratio may react to fiscal shocks because government employment is expanded.
To investigate the role of government employment, we decompose the dynamics of the aggregate
gender employment ratio into the dynamics of gender employment ratios within sectors and the
employment dynamics between sectors. Specifically, we estimate a VAR where we include the
government to non-government employment ratio, the gender employment ratio in government
employment, and the gender employment ratio in private (non-government) employment (next to
the budget deficit, real GDP, and aggregate employment, as in our baseline VAR). This specification
allows us to disentangle a composition effect (i.e., an increase in government employment relative
to non-government employment) from changes within sectors (i.e., changes in the gender ratios
within the government and non-government sector, respectively). Otherwise, the specification of
the VAR is identical to our baseline model in Section 2.
Figure 2 summarizes the results for the three employment variables discussed above (the re-
sponses of the remaining variables are very similar as in the baseline model). In response to
non-fiscal shocks, we observe a drop in the ratio of government employment to non-government
employment, which is to be expected for a non-fiscal shock, see the left panel in Figure 2(a).
Moreover, we observe a drop in the female to male ratio in non-government employment, see the
right panel in Figure 2(a). These findings show that man-cessions take place predominantly in the
private sector.
Most interestingly, for the non-fiscal shock, we observe a combination of composition effects
and within-sector effects. Figure 2(b) shows that the increase in the aggregate gender employment
ratio documented in Section 2 stems from a rise in both the ratio of government to non-government
employment, see the left panel in Figure 2(b), and in the female to male ratio in private (non-
government) employment, see the right panel in Figure 2(b). That is, one reason for the stronger
employment effects of fiscal policy on women is a composition effect with respect to government
employment, which is a sector where women are over-represented. This effect is enforced by the
as published by the BLS.
9In our CPS MORG sample, the female share in government employment is about 55%, while it amounts to about
46% in total employment.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses in VAR decomposing the dynamics of the gender employment ratio
into between-sectors dynamics and within-sector dynamics.
(a) Non-fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
fact that, after a fiscal shock, employment of women rises disproportionately to that of men also
within the private (non-government) sector, see the right panel in Figure 2(b).10
Quantitatively, our results suggest that the composition effect with respect to government
employment is moderate. To illustrate this point, we conduct a similar back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation as in the previous section, based on median responses one year after the shock. After
a fiscal shock, 37.8% of the additional jobs are created in the government sector. If we assume,
counterfactually, that the gender shares within sectors remain constant, it results that 48.0% of
the total number of new jobs created in both, the government and non-government sectors, would
accrue to women.11 This is about 2.5 percentage points larger than the share of new jobs created
10Interestingly, we do not find significant gender differences in the employment reaction within the public sector (see
the middle panel in Figure 2(b)). The government tends to expand its workforce more or less in its initial gender
proportions.
11This number is calculated as the share of government employment in new jobs (37.8%) times female share in
government employment (54.7%) plus share of non-government employment in new jobs (62.2%) times female share
in non-government employment (44.0%).
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for women that would leave the gender composition of total employment unchanged.12 Our results
show that a more substantial part is to be attributed to developments within non-government
(private) employment, where women’s employment rises relative to that of men.
A potential reason for the larger increase in female relative to male employment is that the
government mostly purchases goods and services produced in industries where women are employed
disproportionately, such as education and health care. However, two of our findings qualify this
view. First, we find similar gender employment effects not only for spending hikes, but also for
tax cuts, see Appendix B. Second, we will show that industries appear to be less important than
occupations for the gender employment effects created by fiscal expansions.
Occupations. Next, we investigate in how far occupation effects are responsible for our finding
that fiscal policy shocks foster job growth primarily for women. For instance, during the recovery
after the Great Recession, traditionally female-dominated occupations have played an important
role. In fact, some commentators have used the term ”pink-collar job boom” in this context.13 To
evaluate the role of occupations for our results, we distinguish between female-dominated (”pink-
collar”) occupations and other (”non-pink-collar”) occupations, respectively.14
In the CPS MORG data, we classify an occupation as a pink-collar occupation if the average
female employment share is at least 60%. The so-defined pink-collar occupations range from
archivists (female share 60.4%) to dental hygienists (98.6%), a full list can be found in Appendix
A. In our sample used in the VAR analysis, 32.5% of individuals have occupations which we classify
as pink-collar occupations. In these ”pink” occupations, the female employment share is 82.9%
while it is only 27.5% in the remaining occupations, which we classify as ”non-pink”.
Figure 3 shows the results for a specification where we decompose the response of the aggre-
gate gender employment ratio by including the ratio of employment in pink-collar occupations to
employment in non-pink-collar occupations (to measure composition effects), as well as the two
gender employment ratios within pink-collar occupations and within non-pink-collar occupations,
12In the sample starting in 1979, the composition-neutral share, which corresponds to the average share of female
employment in total employment, is 45.6%.
13See, e.g., David Francis’ contribution in U.S. News (Sep. 10, 2012).
14We follow Autor and Dorn (2013) in constructing 332 occupation categories in the CPS MORG data which are
consistently defined over the whole sample. Their classification system provides a balanced panel of occupations
covering the 1980, 1990, and the 2000 Census classifications by mapping Census occupation codes to a unified
category system.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses in VAR decomposing the dynamics of the gender employment ratio
into between-occupations dynamics and within-occupation dynamics.
(a) Non-fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
respectively.15
Panel (a) shows that, in response to expansionary non-fiscal shocks, employment in non-pink-
collar occupations rises disproportionately. This indicates that occupations play a role in explaining
man-cessions. But we also observe substantial reactions of the gender employment ratio within
occupation groups, particularly within non-pink-collar occupations.
Occupations play a major role for the employment effects of fiscal policy by gender. The left
panel in Figure 3(b) shows that fiscal expansions trigger a pink-collar job boom, i.e. employment
in female-dominated occupations rises more strongly than employment in other occupations. This
raises the aggregate gender employment ratio by construction since women are over-represented
in pink-collar occupations. Interestingly, we do not observe a significant change in the gender
employment ratio in non-pink-collar occupations, see the right panel in Figure 3(b). Note that
15In this specification, the sample ends in 2010Q4 since there was another major change in the occupational classification
system in 2011.
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there is even a significant reduction in the female-to-male employment ratio within pink-collar
occupations. Apparently, fiscal expansions induce men to pick up jobs in traditionally female-
dominated occupations.16
Within neither of the two occupation groups, female employment rises relative to male employ-
ment. This means that the composition effect with respect to occupations, visible in the left panel
of Figure 3(b), is driving the female-biased employment effects of fiscal policy in the aggregate.
Quantitatively, the composition effect is rather important. When gender shares within occupations
remained constant, the median responses one year after the shock would imply that roughly all
of the additional jobs accrue to women.17 However, the actual female share of additional jobs is
smaller since the share of men in pink-collar occupations increases.
Industries. To complement the analysis, we now investigate the role of industry effects. The
CPS MORG data allows us to construct 195 industry classifications which are consistently defined
over the whole sample. We categorize an industry as female-dominated if the average share of
women in this industry is at least 60%. The female-dominated industries range from hotels and
motels (female share 61.1%) to dressmaking shops (96.5%), a full list can be found in Appendix
A. For simplicity, we refer to female-dominated industries as ”pink” and to non-female-dominated
industries as ”non-pink” industries.18
Figure 4 summarizes the results from a specification where we decompose the aggregate gen-
der employment ratio into a between-industry component and two within-industry components.
Figure 4(a) shows that industries play a major role for understanding man-cessions. The ratio of
employment in female-dominated industries to employment in other industries is counter-cyclical
in response to non-fiscal shocks, indicating that employment in female-dominated industries is less
cyclical than employment in other industries. This is generally in line with the results of Hoynes,
Miller, and Schaller (2012) who consider employment cyclicality by gender and industry without
distinguishing between drivers of the business cycle.
16Bansak, Graham, and Zebedee (2012) have documented that the gender desegregation of occupations is accelerated
in upswings, which is in line with our results.
17Share of pink-collar occupations in new jobs (132.3%) times female share in pink-collar occupations (82.9%) plus
share of non-pink-collar occupations in new jobs (-32.3%) times female share in non-pink-collar occupations (27.5%)
=100.8%.
18Note that our interest lies on the industry mix of the created jobs rather than on the industry mix of the goods and
services purchased by the government.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses in VAR decomposing the dynamics of the gender employment ratio
into between-industry dynamics and within-industry dynamics.
(a) Non-fiscal shock
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(b) Fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
While we documented in the previous subsection that occupation effects are important for
understanding the employment effects of fiscal policy by gender, Figure 4(b) shows that effects at
the industry level are much less important in this respect. In fact, after fiscal shocks, we do not
observe substantial variation in between-industry employment, but, rather, there are substantial
changes in the gender composition within industry groups.19
Discussion. All in all, the results documented in this section suggest that the effects of fiscal
policy on the gender composition of employment are mainly due to fiscal expansions fostering job
creation foremost in female-dominated (pink-collar) occupations. Further, we have shown that the
disproportionate employment gains of women do not reflect pure composition effects stemming
from the industry mix of the created jobs. In fact, the gender employment ratio is also affected
within industries, as shown above. We now take a comprehensive view on the evidence presented
19To make sure that our analysis does not just pick up the effects of employment in the government sector, we repeated
the estimations concerning occupation dynamics and industry dynamics using private (non-government) employment
only. We find very similar results when we restrict the data to private employment, see Appendix B.
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above and briefly discuss three potential interpretations of the documented occupational dynamics.
First, the overall patterns documented in this paper are consistent with a production technol-
ogy that implies different output sensitivities of labor demand across occupations. As an example,
consider a kindergarten facing an increase in the demand for child care. Most likely, the kinder-
garten will demand more services of kindergarten teachers (a typical pink-collar occupation) but
it is less clear that it will also hire additional caretakers (a typical non-pink-collar occupation). As
a second example, consider a car producing firm facing a demand peak. At least some of the addi-
tional cars can be produced by raising capital utilization or can be supplied from inventories. As a
consequence, the firm’s demand for assembly line workers (a typical non-pink-collar occupation) is
likely to rise less than proportionally with demand. By contrast, office services can neither easily
be produced using capital nor stored such that the firm is likely to raise its demand for office and
managerial employees (pink-collar occupations) more or less proportionally with output. Thus,
labor in pink-collar occupations may rise hand in hand with output within industries or firms,
whereas non-pink-collar labor may rise less than proportionally with output.
A second interpretation rests on the differential importance of firm-specific human capital in
different occupations. Firm-specific human capital is known to make firms reluctant to adjust
labor input along the extensive margin since, e.g., hirings are associated with training costs. If
firm-specific human capital is less important in personal-service occupations (which are typical
pink-collar occupations), this would induce employment in these occupations to rise relatively
more strongly when total labor demand is expanded.20
A third interpretation is related to what the management literature has labeled the servitization
of products (e.g., Kastalli and Looy 2013). Servitization of products means that certain products
have a higher service component today than in the past. If such change takes the form of entering
products having higher service components than incumbent products, the pro-cyclicality of product
entry and innovation in general, as shown by, e.g., Fabrizio and Tsolmon (2014), can explain why, in
response to demand expansions, employment in pink-collar (mostly service-oriented) occupations
tends to increase more strongly than in non-pink-collar occupations. While this is in line with
what we found empirically, one would expect similar developments also for the economy’s industry
20For instance, Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom (2014) provide empirical evidence that the importance of firm-specific
human capital varies across occupations.
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mix where we found only weak effects.
For expansionary non-fiscal shocks, we have documented that they cause a drop in the pink to
non-pink occupation ratio rather than an increase, see Figure 3. At first sight, this does not seem
to square with the interpretations discussed above which, in principle, also apply for expansionary
non-fiscal shocks. Yet, the results also show that non-fiscal shocks cause employment in non-pink,
male-dominated, industries to rise disproportionately, see Figure 4. This lowers the economy-wide
pink to non-pink occupation ratio via a composition effect since female-dominated industries also
employ a large share of pink-collar workers.
4 Conclusion
We have estimated VAR models and identified the employment effects of fiscal and non-fiscal
shocks by gender using sign restrictions. Contractionary non-fiscal shocks lead to man-cessions,
i.e. to disproportionate job losses for men. Our main result is that a fiscal stimulus leads to a
disproportionate surge in the employment of women relative to that of men. Taken together, this
implies a trade-off dilemma for fiscal policy that aims to stabilize the level of employment along
with its composition. Men are hit hardest in recessions but a fiscal stimulus predominantly fosters
job creation for women.
We have performed a number of additional evaluations in order to explore potential explanations
for our results. One reason for the disparate gender effects of fiscal policy is the expansion of gov-
ernment employment, but its quantitative importance is limited. The gender-specific employment
effects of fiscal policy are mainly explained by the dynamics of occupational employment, whereas
industry effects matter less. By contrast, industry dynamics are important for understanding why
man-cessions occur in the first place.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Data sources and definitions
Table A1: Data sources
Series Title Series ID Source
Civilian Noninstitutional Population CNP16OV BLS
Civilian Employment-Population Ratio EMRATIO BLS
Employment-Population Ratio – Women LNS12300002 BLS
Employment-Population Ratio – Men LNS12300001 BLS
Government Current Expenditures: Interest Payments A180RC1Q027SBEA BEA
Gross Domestic Product GDP BEA
Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator GDPDEF BEA
Net Government Saving TGDEF BEA
Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory
Employees: Total Private
AHEPTI BLS
Current Tax Receipts W054RC1Q027SBEA BEA
Effective Federal Funds Rate FEDFUNDS BFED
Government Consumption Expenditures A955RC1Q027SBEA BEA
Gross Government Investment A782RC1Q027SBEA BEA
Gross Private Domestic Investment GPDI BEA
Personal Consumption Expenditures PCE BEA
Notes: BLS: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BEA: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, BFED: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
Table A2: Definition of variables
Variable Definition Description
Primary Deficit hp
(
−(TGDEF+A180RC1Q027SBEA)
mean(GDP )
) cyclical component of real primary gov-
ernment deficit relative to average GDP
Output hp
(
log
(
(GDP )
(GDPDEF )·(CNP16OV )
)) cyclical component of log real GDP per
capita
Aggregate Employment hp (log (EMRATIO))
cyclical component of log aggregate
employment
Female-male Employment Ratio hp
(
log
(
LNS12300002
LNS12300001
)) cyclical component of log employment
ratio between women and men
Government Spending hp
(
log
(
(A955...)+(A782...)
GDPDEF ·CNP16OV
)) cyclical component of log real govern-
ment spending per capita
Tax Revenues hp
(
log
(
W054RC1Q027SBEA
GDPDEF ·CNP16OV
)) cyclical component of log real govern-
ment tax revenues per capita
Real interest rate hp
(
FEDFUNDS
100
− log
(
GDPDEF (+1)
GDPDEF
)
· 4
) cyclical component of annualized real
interest rate
Private Domestic Spending hp
(
log
(
(PCE+GPDI)
(GDPDEF )·(CNP16OV )
)) cyclical component of log real private
domestic spending
Hourly Earnings hp
(
log
(
AHEPTI
GDPDEF
)) cyclical component of log real hourly
earnings
Notes: The function hp stands for Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter using a smoothing parameter of 1600. (+1) indicates
a one-quarter lead.
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A.2 Occupation and industry classifications in the CPS-MORG
The CPS is a representative monthly household survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, covering a number of demographic and labor-market related questions. The Merged
Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) is a subset of the full CPS sample (25,000 or more indi-
viduals per month) and can be downloaded from the National Bureau of Economic Research:
http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/.
We checked that aggregating the monthly CPS-MORG micro data to quarterly, seasonally
adjusted time series yields virtually identical time series as published by the BLS. We include
individuals aged 16 and over and use the CPS Earnings Weight when collapsing the micro data.
The CPS Labor Force Status variable is used to classify individuals as working. In the evaluations
using occupation-specific or industry-specific employment data, we drop observations with missing
information on these variables. Below, we provide the lists of occupations and industries that we
classify as ”pink”, i.e., female-dominated. The share of female workers is provided in parentheses.
Occupations. Female-dominated occupations are Archivists and curators (60.6%), Psycholo-
gists (60.8%), Personal service occupations, n.e.c. (61.4%), Human resources and labor relations
managers (62.1%), Respiratory therapists (62.5%), Batch food makers (63.0%), Computer and
peripheral equipment operators (64.0%), Office machine operators, n.e.c. (64.3%), Packers, fillers,
and wrappers (64.4%), Vocational and educational counselors (65.6%), Animal caretakers, except
farm (65.6%), Door-to-door sales, street sales, and news vendors (65.9%), Teachers, n.e.c. (66.1%),
Dental laboratory and medical appliance technicians (66.2%), Packers and packagers by hand
(66.5%), Human resources clerks, excluding payroll and timekeeping (66.5%), Other telecom op-
erators (66.7%), Supervisors of personal service jobs, n.e.c. (66.8%), Personnel, HR, training, and
labor relations specialists (66.9%), Supervisors of food preparation and service (67.6%), Recreation
and fitness workers (67.8%), Health technologists and technicians, n.e.c. (67.9%), Food prepara-
tion workers (68.1%), Crossing guards (68.3%), Bill and account collectors (68.4%), Transporta-
tion ticket and reservation agents (68.7%), Laundry and dry cleaning workers (68.7%), Insurance
underwriters (70.0%), Office supervisors (70.4%), Knitters, loopers, and toppers, textile opera-
tives (71.4%), Insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators (71.6%), Managers of medicine
ii
and health occupations (72.0%), Clothing pressing machine operators (72.2%), Physical therapists
(72.3%), Graders and sorters of agricultural products (72.5%), Customer service reps, invest., ad-
justers, excluding insurance (72.5%), Social workers (72.6%), Winding and twisting textile and
apparel operatives (72.6%), Hotel clerks (73.6%), Public transportation attendants and inspectors
(73.7%), Radiologic technologists and technicians (74.5%), Therapists, n.e.c. (75.0%), Shoemaking
machine operators (76.4%), Correspondence and order clerks (76.9%), Clinical laboratory tech-
nologies and technicians (77.4%), Proofreaders (79.0%), Statistical clerks (79.9%), Administrative
support jobs, n.e.c. (80.0%), Legal assistants and paralegals (80.3%), Library assistants (80.5%),
Welfare service workers (80.9%), Interviewers, enumerators, and surveyors (81.3%), Management
support occupations (81.9%), Cashiers (82.0%), Dressmakers, seamstresses, and tailors (82.1%),
Dancers (82.9%), General office clerks (83.0%), File clerks (83.5%), Records clerks (83.7%), Waiters
and waitresses (84.1%), Primary school teachers (84.6%), Special education teachers (85.1%), Li-
brarians (85.6%), Data entry eyers (85.6%), Sales demonstrators, promoters, and models (86.2%),
Housekeepers, maids, butlers, and cleaners (86.7%), Eligibility clerks for government programs,
social welfare (87.2%), Payroll and timekeeping clerks (88.4%), Billing clerks and related financial
records processing (88.9%), Health and nursing aides (89.2%), Occupational therapists (90.2%),
Telephone operators (90.4%), Textile sewing machine operators (90.8%), Bank tellers (91.1%),
Hairdressers and cosmetologists (91.5%), Health record technologists and technicians (91.6%), Di-
eticians and nutritionists (91.9%), Speech therapists (92.3%), Bookkeepers and accounting and au-
diting clerks (92.4%), Teacher’s aides (93.3%), Receptionists and other information clerks (94.3%),
Registered nurses (94.3%), Typists (95.4%), Child care workers (95.8%), Licensed practical nurses
(95.9%), Dental Assistants (97.7%), Kindergarten and earlier school teachers (98.2%), Secretaries
and stenographers (98.4%), Dental hygienists (98.6%).
Industries. Female-dominated industries are Hotels and motels (61.1%), Leather products, ex-
cept footwear (61.3%), Insurance (61.7%), Laundry, cleaning, and garment services (62.2%), Mem-
bership organizations (62.5%), Offices of chiropractors (63.9%), Footwear, except rubber and plastic
(64.5%), Dairy product stores (64.9%), Personnel supply services (65.2%), Retail bakeries (65.9%),
Credit agencies, n.e.c., savings and loan associations (66.3%), Drug stores (66.6%), Jewelry stores
(66.7%), Educational services, n.e.c., business, trade, and vocational schools (67.2%), Misc. fabri-
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cated textile products (67.7%), Department stores and mail order houses (69.7%), Knitting mills
(71.0%), Banking (71.2%), Offices of health practitioners, n.e.c., offices of optometrists (71.6%),
Misc. general merchandise stores and sewing, needlework, and piece good stores (72.3%), Resi-
dential care facilities, without nursing (73.3%), Lodging places, except hotels and motels (74.6%),
Variety stores (75.5%), Offices of physicians (75.5%), Direct selling establishments (75.6%), Retail
florists (75.6%), Social services, n.e.c. (75.7%), Heath services, n.e.c., job training and vocational
rehab services (76.3%), Elementary and secondary schools, child day care services (77.5%), Hospi-
tals (78.0%), Offices of dentists (78.6%), Apparel and accessory stores, except shoe (78.8%), Ap-
parel and accessories, except knit (79.5%), Libraries (81.2%), Private households (87.6%), Nursing
and personal care facilities (87.6%), Beauty shops (89.6%), Dressmaking shops (96.5%).
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B Robustness checks
Baseline model. Figure A1 summarizes the results from various robustness checks for our main
finding that fiscal expansions lead to a disproportionate increase in the employment of women
and that contractionary non-fiscal shocks lead to man-cessions. The upper left panels in Figures
A1(a) and A1(b) show our baseline specification for the sake of comparison. Our main results are
robust to changing the starting date of the sample, to including a set of macroeconomic controls
(real interest rate, hourly earnings, and private domestic spending), to including fiscal controls
(government spending and tax revenues), to imposing the sign restrictions for two instead of
four quarters, and to relaxing the sign restriction on aggregate employment. Note that, in all
specifications, the female to male employment ratio reacts negatively to expansionary non-fiscal
shocks in at least 90% of the accepted models. Likewise, in at least 90% of the accepted models,
the ratio reacts positively to expansionary fiscal shocks.
Tax shocks versus spending shocks. Here, we present results for a specification where we
decompose the fiscal shock into government spending shocks and tax shocks, respectively. To
identify government spending shocks and tax shocks separately, we include tax revenues and gov-
ernment spending as additional variables in the baseline VAR and impose the identifying restric-
tions discussed in Canova and Pappa (2007). A government spending shock raises spending and
tax revenues, whereas an expansionary tax shock reduces tax revenues. In all other respects, the
specification is as in the baseline VAR from Section 2. In particular, both fiscal shocks induce a
positive co-movement of GDP and the deficit. Figures A2(a) and A2(b) show the responses to a
government spending shock and to an expansionary tax shock, respectively. The most important
result is that the gender employment ratio increases after both types of fiscal stimuli. The results
for the non-fiscal shock are very similar to the baseline VAR, see Figure 1, and are therefore not
shown (after a non-fiscal shock, tax receipts increase and government spending does not change
significantly).
Occupations and industries. Figures A3 and A4 show the results for a specification where we
exclude government employees when collapsing the occupation- and industry specific employment
data. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in the main text.
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Figure A1: Impulse responses of the female to male employment ratio in different specifications.
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(b) Fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
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Figure A2: Impulse responses to tax shocks and spending shocks.
(a) Spending shock
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(b) Tax shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
vii
Figure A3: Impulse responses in VAR decomposing the dynamics of the gender employment
ratio into between-occupation dynamics and within-occupation dynamics, excluding government
employment
(a) Non-fiscal shock
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(b) Fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
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Figure A4: Impulse responses in VAR decomposing the dynamics of the gender employment ratio
into between-industry dynamics and within-industry dynamics, excluding government employment
(a) Non-fiscal shock
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(b) Fiscal shock
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Notes: The solid lines are the median responses and the grey shaded areas show the 16th-84th percentiles of 10,000
estimated responses, sorted at each horizon. The responses are expressed in percentage terms. On the horizontal
axes, the horizon is given in quarters. The median impact response of GDP (not shown) is normalized to one percent.
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